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SPATIAL TERRORISM 
Dawinder S. Sidhu* 
ABSTRACT 
Terrorism, under federal law, generally means an act of politically 
or socially motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.  
Terrorism within the meaning of federal law, in other words, exists 
only if a cognizable and particular motive is uncovered.  This 
definition also sees the United States as an undifferentiated 
landscape; by its own terms, it fails to take into account any 
geographic nuance in acts of mass violence. 
This Article suggests that spatial considerations are relevant in 
determining whether an act of mass violence constitutes an act of 
terrorism for purposes of federal law.  It points to cities—which are 
characterized by a highly concentrated, fluid population, and which 
thus have more potential victims of indiscriminate violence—to 
demonstrate the propriety of considering space in an analysis of 
whether terrorism has occurred.  It further argues that spatial 
dimensions lend support to shifting the definition of terrorism away 
from an exclusively instrumental, subjective intent model and towards 
a more comprehensive descriptive, objective action paradigm. 
The existing terrorism scheme has generated confusion and 
unsatisfactory results.  As incidents of mass violence continue to 
occur, the need for a coherent terrorism definition is particularly 
pressing and acute for prosecutors, judges, public officials, and a 
society attempting to conceptualize and categorize these incidents.  
Spatial considerations may provide greater consistency and clarity to 
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the existing definitions of terrorism, further the underlying purposes 
of defining terrorism as an independent legal harm, and catalyze a 
recalibrated, proper definition of terrorism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent months, the people of the United States have witnessed 
and suffered several incidents of mass violence.  The incidents—fresh 
in the hearts and minds of the people1—need no elaboration.  Brief 
examples are therefore sufficient to provide the necessary factual 
background for this legal discussion. 
On July 20, 2012, in Aurora, Colorado, James Holmes tossed gas 
canisters into a movie theater crowd that had assembled for the 
premiere of a widely anticipated feature film, and then proceeded to 
open fire, killing twelve individuals.2  On August 5, 2012, Wade 
                                                                                                                 
 1. These incidents, to borrow a phrase from the Supreme Court, are “too recent 
to be called history.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872). 
 2. See Dan Frosch & Kirk Johnson, Gunman Kills 12 in Colorado, Reviving Gun 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/us/shooting-
at-colorado-theater-showing-batman-movie.html.  “The total number of victims,” the 
Department of Justice assessed, “is more than 1,500.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Office for Victims of Crime Announces $2.9 Million Grant to Support 
Victims in Aurora, Colo. (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
newsroom/pressreleases/2013/ojppr021313.pdf (“This includes the twelve killed, sixty-
nine wounded and their families, other people in the theater complex at that time, 
people evacuated from an apartment complex where explosive devices were 
discovered, and first responders to the emergency.”). 
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Michael Page entered the grounds of a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, 
Wisconsin, killing six worshippers and ultimately killing himself 
during a firefight with responding law enforcement officers.3  On 
December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza shot and killed twenty-seven 
individuals, including twenty children (none older than seven years 
old), at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, 
Connecticut, meeting the same self-inflicted fate as Page.4  On April 
14, 2013, twin bombs exploded near the finish line of the Boston 
Marathon, killing three and injuring over 170 individuals.5 
These incidents are unique in their respective factual 
circumstances.  They are bound nonetheless by a common, self-
evident truth: each was a horrific event in which numerous innocent 
lives (and only innocent lives) were targeted and violently eliminated.  
It is perhaps because of the heinous nature and scale of the incidents 
that public leaders at the highest levels and others have considered 
the incidents to be acts of terrorism.  For example, speaking at a 
memorial service for the victims of the Oak Creek shooting, Attorney 
General Eric Holder stated, without equivocation, that “precisely 
what happened here [was] an act of terrorism.”6  In remarks following 
the twin bombings in Boston, President Obama called the incident 
“an act of terrorism.”7  President Obama also declared, “Any time 
bombs are used to target innocent civilians, it is an act of terror.”8  
Given the underlying and unifying qualities of these incidents, in 
which many innocents (and only innocents) were randomly targeted 
and killed, the Attorney General and the President’s particular 
assessments, as well as the President’s general rule, seem appropriate. 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Rick Romell, 7 Killed, Including Shooter, at Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, J. 
SENTINEL (Milwaukee), Aug. 6, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/news/crime/reports-of-
people-shot-at-sikh-temple-in-oak-creek-qc6cgc0-165059506.html; see also 
Transcripts, CNN (Aug. 6, 2012), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ 
1208/06/cnr.03.html (containing statement of Oak Creek Police Chief John Edwards). 
 4. See Connor Simpson et al., Newtown School Shooting: Live Updates, 
ATLANTIC WIRE (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2012/12/ 
newtown-connecticut-school-shooting/59999/. 
 5. See Chelsea Conaboy et al., Investigation of Boston Marathon Bombings 
Continues, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/ 
04/16/some-areas-downtown-boston-reopen-today-boston-marathon-bombing-
investigation-continues/qTROe6L0b98qRl9W7dnWiJ/story.html. 
 6. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at 
Oak Creek Memorial Service (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/ 
speeches/2012/ag-speech-1208101.html. 
 7. Mark Landler, Obama Calls Blasts an ‘Act of Terrorism’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/us/politics/obama-calls-marathon-
bombings-an-act-of-terrorism.html. 
 8. Id. 
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Federal law, however, seems to disagree.  Federal law generally 
requires that an act of violence be politically or socially motivated to 
constitute an act of terrorism.9  With respect to the Oak Creek 
shooting, for example, the perpetrator died at the scene, frustrating 
any attempt to identify his motive.10  Other evidence obtained since 
the shooting has failed to reveal the motivation necessary to consider 
it an “act of terror” under federal law.11  Thus, the Attorney General’s 
emphatic statement that the Oak Creek shooting constituted 
terrorism cannot be squared with federal terrorism law.  With respect 
to the Boston bombings, to provide another example, President 
Obama called the incident an act of terrorism before there was any 
knowledge of who committed the atrocities, let alone why.12  Yet the 
“why”—a political or social motive—needs to be present in order for 
federal terrorism law to follow.  Accordingly, due to the absence of an 
identifiable motive, President Obama’s statement that the Boston 
Marathon bombings were an act of terrorism could not be supported 
under federal law. 
As these examples reveal, there is an important disconnect 
between the leaders’ positions—which seem tied to the abhorrent 
nature of the incidents—and the existing federal definitions—which 
are tied, by contrast, to subjective motivation.13  The Articles in this 
issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal explore the relationship 
between cities and terrorism.  This particular Article argues that the 
spatial characteristics of an incident may help inform the normative 
question as to when an incident should qualify as “terrorism” within 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012). See generally infra Part II.A. 
 10. See SCOTT MCALLISTER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., TESTIMONY ON “HATE CRIMES AND DOMESTIC EXTREMISM” 
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2012), 
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/9-19-12McAllisterTestimony.pdf. 
 11. A report issued months after the shooting notes, at the outset, that “[n]o one 
knows what drove Wade Michael Page to walk into the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin on 
a Sunday morning last August and start shooting worshippers with a 9 mm handgun.” 
Marilyn Elias, Sikh Temple Killer Wade Michael Page Radicalized in Army, 
INTELLIGENCE REP., Winter 2012, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2012/winter/massacre-in-wisconsin. 
 12. See Boston Bombings: Obama Condemns ‘Act of Terrorism’, BBC NEWS 
(Apr. 16, 2013), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22171684 (“President Barack 
Obama has condemned the twin bombing at the Boston Marathon as a ‘terrorist 
act’ . . . . [T]he motive and culprit were not yet known and no-one was in custody.”). 
 13. Compare id., with CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR 1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
ftpdocs/60xx/doc6042/12-20-homelandsecurity.pdf (defining terrorism as “criminal 
acts by individuals or groups . . . motivated by political or social agendas” (emphasis 
added)). 
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the meaning of federal law.  It suggests specifically that the spatial 
dimensions of an incident not only matter, but indicate that the 
federal definition of terrorism should be triggered by “objective” 
conduct, not just by “subjective” motivation.  That is, in resolving the 
apparent tension between the “what” (the objective paradigm) and 
the “why” (the subjective paradigm), the “where” (spatial 
considerations) of an incident is both relevant and points to the 
propriety of including the objective side of the spectrum in federal 
terrorism law. 
This Article arrives at this conclusion by way of the following 
structure: Part I looks to the early conceptual foundations of 
terrorism—that which causes terror or fright (a descriptive 
understanding) and that which is calculated to cause terror or fright 
(an instrumental understanding).  It also explores the first-order 
purposes of terrorism law: to socially marginalize the perpetrator of 
premeditated mass violence against innocents, and to apply an 
especially robust set of legal punishments to individuals that are 
deemed to be “terrorists.”  Part II summarizes the current definition 
of terrorism under federal law.  It also applies this definition to the 
four aforementioned incidents to demonstrate how the existing 
definition works in practice. 
Drawing on other doctrinal areas that take physical settings into 
account, Part III suggests that the geographic qualities of an act of 
violence are salient in ascertaining whether “terrorism” has occurred.  
Cities, for example, are home to more innocents and thus more 
potential victims of indiscriminate violence.  Part III also addresses 
whether, aside from cities, other spaces in our society, such as schools 
or places of worship, deserve special solicitude from federal terrorism 
laws.  From this discussion, it proposes this definition: “terrorism” 
means premeditated violence perpetrated indiscriminately against 
innocents, where the factors that may support the terrorism 
designation are whether the violence was (1) perpetrated in an area 
with a high concentration of innocents, a public area of constitutional 
significance wherein individuals congregate or associate, or an area 
essential to the operation of the government wherein individuals 
work, engage in official government business, or are educated, or (2) 
calculated to further a political, religious, or social agenda.  Next, Part 
III will apply this reformulated understanding of terrorism—one that 
acknowledges an objective or descriptive paradigm of terrorism—to 
the same four incidents to show how the proposed definition would 
play out.  Part IV responds to potential counterarguments, including 
the concern that an “objective” definition of terrorism is too generous 
and will dilute its meaning, by offering limiting principles.  This Part 
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also makes clear that while objective conduct is the preferred 
definition of terrorism according to this Article, motive-based 
terrorism still may fall within that definition. 
“Terrorism” remains, perhaps inherently, an ambiguous and 
loaded term.  At present, there are outstanding questions as to why 
one incident is designated an act of terrorism, while another not.14  As 
with obscenity, a belief as to whether terrorism has occurred seems 
grounded more in an intuitive, visceral reaction than in the 
dispassionate application of established rules.15  Whether an incident 
falls within the bounds of terrorism seems more personal than 
formal,16 and these judgment calls are further complicated by the soft 
borders between terrorism and other categories of cognizable harm, 
such as simple premeditated murder.17 
This Article does not pretend to solve the definitional problems 
with “terrorism,” but attempts to offer considerations that may tend 
to reduce not only the indeterminacy associated with the term, but 
the apparent mismatch between political or social views as to when 
terrorism occurs, on the one hand, and the law as to when terrorism 
has occurred, on the other.  Therefore, in terms of the practical value 
of this Article, it suggests specifically that an appreciation for the 
geographic variations of an incident can clarify when the terrorism 
label is appropriate.  Further, it shows how federal definitions of 
terrorism informed by spatial dimensions comport more fully with, 
and allow for the fuller expression of, the social disapproval of certain 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Why Is Boston ‘Terrorism’ but not Aurora, 
Sandy Hook, Tucson and Columbine?, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 22, 2013, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/22/boston-marathon-terrorism-
aurora-sandy-hook; see also Scott Wong, Claire McCaskill: If Boston Bombings are 
Terrorism, Why not Sandy Hook?, POLITICO (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.politico. 
com/story/2013/04/claire-mccaskill-terrorism-boston-marathon-sandy-hook-
90213.html?hp=l2. 
 15. See Jacqueline S. Hodgson & Victor Tadros, The Impossibility of Defining 
Terrorism, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 494, 495 (2013) (“We are often secure in our 
knowledge that a terrorist attack has been committed when we see it, yet a credible 
definition of terrorism eludes us.”). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Lloyd J. Dumas, Counterterrorism and Economic Policy, 21 TRANSNAT’L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85 (2012) (“All acts of terrorism committed by non-
governmental groups are crimes.  They involve such acts as . . . murder . . . .”); see 
also Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations on Terrorism & Anti-Terrorism Law & 
Literature, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1097 (2003) (“If a common crime such as 
murder is committed in a manner that conforms to terrorism, it appears that the 
terror element functions as an aggravating factor, enhancing the punishment.”). 
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incidents.18  More broadly, this Article supports an amendment to the 
federal definition of terrorism so that it includes objective conduct 
and considers spatial context. 
In doctrinal terms, this Article seeks to build on the important 
work of legal scholars who are exploring the relationship between 
space and the law generally19 and who, in the specific realm of 
terrorism, are calling attention to the “vertical” relationship between 
the federal government and state/local governments in the national 
security apparatus, where the dominant focus in the national security 
context has been on the “horizontal” dynamics between the three 
branches of the federal government.20  This Article hopes to enrich 
the emerging conversation on space and to highlight the deeper 
complexities even within the sub-federal plane by showing that 
federal terrorism law should be mindful of variations in setting. 
 
I.  PURPOSES OF THE “TERRORISM” CLASSIFICATION 
A. Basic Meanings of the Term 
The term “terrorism,” as may be obvious, is derived from the root 
word “terror.”21  Prior to the founding of the United States, the word 
“terror” was descriptive; it was used as a synonym for other words 
that each described a state of fright or horror.  For example, in 1756, 
Edmund Burke, the prominent Irish political philosopher, observed 
that that politicians “cause terror and hatred.”22  He also referenced 
the “mixed passion of terror and surprise” that a man may experience 
upon being extricated from a dangerous situation,23 likened terror to 
“pain and danger”24 and “panic,”25 stated that “excessive loudness” 
                                                                                                                 
 18. At present, the leaders seem constrained in the use of “terrorism” in the 
immediate aftermath of incidents, and are instead inclined to wait until a motive can 
be unearthed. See Halimah Abdullah, Obama Has Learned Tough Lessons on Using 
the Word ‘Terror’, CNN (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/16/politics/ 
terror-word/index.html. 
 19. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168 (2011). 
 20. See generally Matthew Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of 
Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012). 
 21. Terrorist, VOCABULARY.COM, http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/terrorist 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 22. 1 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 20 (James Prior 
ed., London, George Bell & Sons 1886). 
 23. Id. at 71; see also id. at 80 (calling “terror” a “passion”). 
 24. Id. at 74. 
 25. Id. at 200. 
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and “night” enhance our “terror,”26 and claimed “love” is the 
opposite of “terror.”27 
This country’s founding generation was aware of this descriptive 
understanding of terror.28  In fact, the founding generation’s use of the 
word “terror” is consistent with this particular meaning of the word.  
For example, John Quincy Adams, writing to John Adams, observed 
that the people of the Netherlands “live[] in constant terror”—a 
condition or state of fear—as they were sandwiched between two 
imposing countries.29 
The word “terror” took on a secondary meaning with the French 
Revolution’s “Reign of Terror,” where, in under a year, thousands 
were killed and tens of thousands were arrested.30  The founding 
generation used the phrase “Reign of Terror” in their writings.31  The 
“Reign of Terror” came to signify the use of terror, generally, as an 
instrument to agitate or excite another, and, specifically, as an 
instrument used in the context of civil conflict or political unrest.32  
“Terror,” combined with the French suffix “isme,” meaning “the 
practice of,” gives us “terrorism”: the practice of terror.33 
In the early years of our nation, there were thus two overall viable 
meanings to “terror”—a descriptive meaning that has its origins prior 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. at 109, 110. 
 27. Id. at 130. 
 28. See, e.g., GEORGE MASON, AN APPENDIX TO AN ESSAY ON DESIGN IN 
GARDENING 6 (London, John White 1795) (discussing Burke’s essay on “terror”). 
 29. Letter from John Quincy Adams to John Adams (Sept. 12, 1795) (on file with 
the Massachusetts Historical Society). 
 30. See Hon. Louis G. Fields, Jr., Contemporary Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 
113 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (noting that the “Reign of Terror” is the “period 
between September 1793 and July 1794 . . . during which an estimated 20,000 persons 
were killed and some 300,000 arrested.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Letter from John Quincy Adams to John Adams 2 (May 20, 1797) 
(on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society) (noting the imprisonment of an 
individual “during the time which they call the reign of terror”); Letter from Abigail 
Adams to William Cranch 3–4 (Nov. 15, 1797) (draft on file with the Massachusetts 
Historical Society) (“[T]he Reign of Terror and absolute despotism has again 
commenced in France by the overthrow and banishment of every man disposed to 
the system of moderation justice & peace . . . . [I]n the Chaos which France is plunged 
no order or harmony can arise, and we have nothing to look for, but Robbery and 
plunder so long as we expose our property unarmed to their grasp . . . .”). 
 32. See David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil 
Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 251 
(1996) (“[T]he term ‘terrorism’ originated in the French Revolution . . . .”); see also 
JURGEN HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH JURGEN 
HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA 152 (2003) (“The current usage of the term 
‘terrorism’ derives from the late phase of the French Revolution, when Robespierre’s 
Reign of Terror engaged in mass executions and purges of civilians.”). 
 33. See JONATHAN MATUSITZ, TERRORISM AND COMMUNICATION 1 (2013). 
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to the French Revolution, and an instrumental meaning that stems 
from the French Revolution.  The authoritative 1828 Webster’s 
American Dictionary of the English Language,34 which took twenty 
years to complete,35 reflects this dual meaning.  The dictionary notes 
at the outset that “terror” is derived from the Latin terreo, or “to 
frighten.”36  It then contains both strands of the meaning of “terror.”  
First, “terror” signals “[t]hat which may excite dread [or that is] the 
cause of extreme fear.”37  In other words, “terror” can be a 
circumstance, a trigger or catalyst that causes the unpleasant 
emotions; it is “that” which generates or provokes “terror.”  This 
meaning aligns with the early descriptive meaning. 
The dictionary also defines “terror” as “[t]he threatenings of 
wicked men, or evil apprehended from them,” and “[a]wful majesty, 
calculated to impress fear.”38  Under this meaning, “terror” is caused 
or planned by deplorable individuals to generate uncomfortable 
emotions in others.39  This second definition of “terror” thus follows 
the instrumental meaning—similar to the “reign of terror.”  In short, 
“terror” is that which may lead to fright and horror, and “terror” is 
also a tactic of fear used by others.  Again, “terror” is what causes 
others to tremble, and what is calculated to cause others to tremble. 
“Terrorism” tracks both definitions of “terror.”  The word 
“terrorism” in the United States did not emerge as its own conceptual 
phrase until after the French Revolution of the late-eighteenth 
century.  For example, it does not appear in the 1828 Webster’s 
dictionary as a separate entry.  “Terrorism” first found its way into an 
American judicial opinion in 1862, when the Court of Appeals of New 
York, in Eadie v. Slimmon, found void an insurance policy that was 
obtained because of “force, terrorism and coercion which overcame 
                                                                                                                 
 34. The dictionary has been cited in thirty-two Supreme Court opinions, including 
lead opinions in major cases, such as District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 
(2008), Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004), and one hundred forty-four 
federal court opinions (based on a Westlaw search last performed on July 19, 2013). 
See Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 
2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1424 (referring to the dictionary as “authoritative”). 
 35. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 36. The first entry of “terror” repeats this basic meaning: “Extreme fear; violent 
dread; fright; fear that agitates the body and mind.” 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. “Terror” has two other entries in Webster’s dictionary: “In Scripture, the 
sudden judgments of God are called terrors;” “Death is emphatically styled the king 
of terrors.” Id. 
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free agency.”40  The word does not make its first appearance in a 
federal court opinion until 1879 in the ordinary context of lawyer 
disbarment.  The attorney in question was suspected of inciting his 
clients to influence the outcome of a case by way of “exciting the fears 
of the judge by the terrorism of newspaper attacks and abusive 
circulars.”41  The attorney appears to have used terrorism in the 
instrumental sense: to intimidate the court.  Eadie suggests that the 
instrumental meaning of terror is not the sole province of 
revolutionaries or political actors.  Around the same time, 
“terrorism” was mentioned by federal courts in similarly mundane 
contexts of the execution of an estate,42 labor protests,43 and 
jurisdiction to issue an injunction.44  The Supreme Court first used the 
term in 1906.45  In Fisher v. Baker, a writ of habeas corpus was 
suspended in the Philippine Islands (then controlled by the United 
States) because “there exists a state of insecurity and terrorism.”46  
The mention of a “state . . . of terrorism” reinforces the notion that 
terrorism contains two meanings, descriptive and instrumental. 
Indeed, while the 1828 edition of Webster’s dictionary only has 
entries for “terror” and not “terrorism,” the 1913 edition has a 
separate entry for “terrorism.”  According to that text, “terrorism” is 
defined both as “[t]he act of terrorizing, or state of being terrorized,” 
which follows the descriptive model, as well as “a mode of 
government by terror or intimidation,” which aligns with the 
instrumental model.47  This gives credence to the suggestion that the 
early understandings of “terror” and “terrorism” have both 
descriptive and instrumental meanings. 
In sum, although “terror” as an instrument of civil conflict or 
political unrest found its genesis in the French Revolution, it is clear 
that “terror” also had a descriptive meaning prior to and independent 
from that political event.  Accordingly, “terrorism” arguably gained 
an additional, supplemental meaning, rather than its exclusive or 
original meaning, from the “reign of terror.”  In modern times, as 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N.Y. 9, 12 (1862). 
 41. Ex parte Cole, 6 F. Cas. 35, 37 (C.C.D. Iowa 1879) (No. 2973). 
 42. See Lipse’s Ex’r v. Spears’ Ex’r, 88 F. 952, 956 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1882). 
 43. See Thomas v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 62 F. 803, 815 
(C.C. Ohio 1894); Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 61 F. 494, 496 (C.C. Ind. 1893). 
 44. See United States v. Agler, 62 F. 824, 825 (C.C.D. Ind. 1894). 
 45. See Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174 (1906). 
 46. Id. at 179–80. 
 47. NOAH WEBSTER, WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1489 (1913). 
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explained more fully below,48 the instrumental definition has eclipsed 
the descriptive definition.  This Article argues that the dormant, 
descriptive sphere of “terrorism” should be revived. 
B. Terrorism as a Separate Category of Legal Harm 
The meanings of “terror” aside, it may not be self-evident why 
federal law should recognize a separate category of harm called 
“terrorism.”  We may all agree that a simple state of fear does not, by 
itself, give rise to a cognizable legal harm.  For someone to 
intentionally spook another and generate a discernible emotional 
condition in another similarly would not be seen as something worthy 
of regulation by law.49  Every emotive artistic performance, bad 
break-up, or game of peak-a-boo would otherwise result in litigation.  
As a result, a state of fear alone, or a calculated attempt to cause fear, 
may not warrant the law’s involvement. 
On the other hand, independent harms that cause fear may 
implicate the law.  Battery, for example, constitutes a physical harm 
to the victim and the nature of assault and battery50 is such that a state 
of fear, and intentional transmission of fear, is a necessary incident to 
the physical harm.51  Rape represents a significant intrusion of bodily 
integrity52 that not only ignores consent and violates the victim 
physically and emotionally, but induces fear and is designed to 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See infra Part II.A. 
 49. An exception is perhaps the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
though the bar to make such a claim is quite high.  “To succeed on a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in Maryland,” for example, “a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme 
and outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.” 
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) (“Liability has been found only where the conduct has been 
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible 
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community.”). 
 50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (“An actor is subject to 
liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive 
contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension 
of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or 
indirectly results.”); see also id. § 18(a) (“An actor is subject to liability to another for 
battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person 
of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) 
an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”). 
 51. See State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582, 584 (1823) (“An assault and battery 
. . . is injurious to the citizens at large by its breach of the peace, by the terror and 
alarm it excites, by the disturbance of that social order which it is the primary object 
of the law to maintain . . . .”). 
 52. See 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2012) (defining rape). 
90 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
generate that fear.53  Premeditated murder—because of its 
preconceived, planned character and deadly results54—may chill 
others in and around the community where the killing occurs.55  Such 
a murder may send a negative message to others in that community or 
affiliated with the victim.56  These crimes are what Robert Nozick 
would call “public wrongs” because they instill fear not only in 
victims, but in non-victims as well.57 
Even though these crimes—battery, rape, and premeditated 
murder—cross the line into what is illegal, and even though they each 
may create fear and/or are calculated to cause fear, they do not fall 
within the ordinary meaning of “terrorism.”  In other words, there is 
something qualitatively different from these “harm plus terror” 
crimes and what constitutes “terrorism.” 
That additional, distinguishing characteristic of “terrorism” may be 
scale.58  An individual battery, rape, or premeditated killing, may 
inflict significant harm, but may be seen nonetheless as a more 
discrete attack or incident whose affect on others is limited.59  An act 
of terrorism, in contrast, has more immediate, direct targets, and has a 
wider impact both in physical and psychic terms.60  The line between 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the 
Wrongs of Forced Sex, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 845, 885 n.123 (2002) (noting the 
powerful testimony of a rape victim on the “sheer fear and terror” resulting from a 
sexual attack). 
 54. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 550 (4th ed. 2006) 
(providing that some courts distinguish premeditated murder as “a ‘cold-blooded’ 
killing, i.e., a homicide committed after calm and careful reflection by the 
wrongdoer”). 
 55. See Christopher J. Meade, Reading Death Sentences: The Narrative 
Construction of Capital Punishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 732, 742 (1996) (“Murders 
spawn a feeling of chaos which instills fear in a community.”). 
 56. See Jennifer M. Smith, Note, An International Hit Job: Prosecuting 
Organized Crime Acts as Crimes Against Humanity, 97 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1144 (2009) 
(“Hits and other violence committed by organized crime groups . . . send a message 
of intimidation to the broader community . . . .”) 
 57. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 67 (1974). 
 58. See Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 579, 587 (2010) (“The context of terror has distinctive features, 
including [an almost unimaginable] scale of harm . . . .”); William F. Zieske, 
Demystifying the USA PATRIOT Act, 92 ILL. B.J. 82, 83 (2004) (“[I]t is inherently 
difficult to draw a definitive line between terrorism and all other crime, other than by 
the scale of impact.”). 
 59. This is not to dismiss or underestimate, by any means, the significant injuries 
that these harms may impose on an individual or others. 
 60. See Stephen P. Marks, Branding the “War on Terrorism”: Is there a “New 
Paradigm” of International Law?, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 71, 73–74 (2006) (“[T]he 
nature of terrorism . . . is [that it is] successful to the extent that relatively small-scale 
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an individualized attack and one that constitutes terrorism may be 
difficult to draw, though it may be comfortably said that an assault in 
a bar falls short while a bombing of the same bar crosses that line. 
The wider psychic impact of terrorism may be particularly 
heightened because terrorism is random; indeed, Cyrille Begorre-Bret 
describes terrorism as a “‘blind’ violence because it . . . strikes at 
random, innocent people.”61  Terrorist incidents are systematic in a 
narrow sense—for example, the perpetrators may target individuals 
who are eating at a restaurant in a busy tourist district, working in a 
landmark building, or flying on a large airplane.  But the targets are 
not individually selected, and are indistinguishable from each other as 
far as the offenders are concerned.  An assault victim may have been 
selected due to some escalating disagreement in a bar.  A terrorist 
event, by contrast, reflects indiscriminate targeting of victims.62  
Political philosopher Michael Walzer, for example, defines terrorism 
simply as “the random murder of innocent people.”63  The fear that an 
act of terrorism generates is therefore larger, because the victim 
literally could be anyone—anyone who happened to be dining at a 
restaurant in that popular area, anyone working in a notable building, 
and anyone who happened to be flying.64  As the particular victims are 
not specially targeted, the sense that “it could have been me” is 
shared more broadly and widens the circle of fear.65 
                                                                                                                 
harm can produce large scale fear and attract [greater attention] than all other causes 
of death . . . .”). 
 61. Cyrille Begorre-Bret, The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of 
Relativism, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1996 (2006). 
 62. See id.; see also Kevin J. Greene, Terrorism as Impermissible Political 
Violence: An International Law Framework, 16 VT. L. REV. 461, 477 (1992) (“[A] 
feature that distinguishes terrorism from other types of political violence ‘is the 
willful and calculated choice of innocents as targets . . . . [T]errorists choose to attack 
weak and defenseless civilians . . . anyone in fact except soldiers, if they can avoid it.  
Civilians, then are the key to the terrorists’ strategy.’” (quoting Benjamin Netanyahu, 
Defining Terrorism, in TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 7, 9–10 (Benjamin 
Netanyahu ed., 1986))). 
 63. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 198 (4th ed. 2000). 
 64. These examples already point to the relevance of space, a point clarified infra 
Part III. 
 65. Yehuda Amichai’s poem, The Diameter of a Bomb, speaks to the impact of 
mass violence: 
The diameter of the bomb was thirty centimeters 
and the diameter of its effective range about seven meters, 
with four dead and eleven wounded. 
And around these in a larger circle 
of pain and time, two hospitals are scattered 
and one graveyard. But the young woman 
who was buried in the city she came from, 
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An interesting question is whether a serial perpetrator may be 
considered a “terrorist” due to the impact of his or her actions in the 
aggregate, where each individual act may not itself rise to the level of 
terrorism.  A serial rapist or murderer may wreak more physical and 
psychic harm on a community than the perpetrator of a single 
incident with one-off targets.  To use a different example, the Ku 
Klux Klan’s behavior—including organizing lynching, inciting 
violence, and intimidating African-Americans—has been said to 
constitute a protracted “reign of terror.”66  A burning of a 
predominantly African-American church is a significant crime, one 
that causes fright and that is calculated to cause fright; the waves of 
fright extend beyond the four corners of the parish’s property to all 
African-Americans in the neighborhood or proximity, and reaches 
effectively all African-Americans.67  But a single church burning is not 
considered terrorism; the collective campaign of intimidation and 
violence, however, may be.68  In any case, federal hate crimes 
legislation, which makes it unlawful for anyone “to attempt to cause 
bodily injury to any person, because of the [person’s] actual or 
                                                                                                                 
at a distance of more than a hundred kilometers, 
enlarges the circle considerably, 
and the solitary man mourning her death 
at the distant shores of a country far across the sea 
includes the entire world in the circle. 
And I won’t even mention the crying of orphans 
that reaches up to the throne of God and 
beyond, making 
a circle with no end and no God. 
Yehuda Amichai, The Diameter of a Bomb, available at http://allpoetry.com/ 
poem/8513183-The-Diameter-Of-The-Bomb-by-Yehuda_Amichai (last visited Nov. 
7, 2013). 
 66. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 353 (2003). 
 67. See generally Troy A. Scotting, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger 
Federal Legislation, 34 AKRON L. REV. 853, 864 (2001) (“[H]ate crimes are seen as 
‘message crimes,’ in effect, sending ‘a message that members of a certain 
group . . . are not wanted in a particular neighborhood, community, workplace, or 
college campus.’” (quoting Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998: Testimony on H.R. 
3081 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Jack 
McDevitt, Professor, Northeastern Univ.))); id. (“When the victim is attacked 
because of an immutable characteristic, members of the target community who share 
the characteristic perceive it ‘as an attack on themselves directly and individually.’” 
(quoting FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE 42 (1999))); id. (“This creates 
a feeling among target community members that any one of them could be a victim of 
similar violence.”). 
 68. This possibility appears to be consistent with the view, expressed by noted 
feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon, that violence against women, a “daily 
war,” is terrorism. See Catherine MacKinnon, Women’s September 11th: Rethinking 
International Law of Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 19 (2006). 
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perceived race [or] color,”69 and federal civil rights laws, which make 
it unlawful for anyone to conspire to deprive another of constitutional 
rights on the basis of race,70 not to mention arson and related state 
offenses, may nonetheless enable society and the government to 
punish strongly this systemic mistreatment of African-Americans.  
These other avenues of redress require us again to question why 
terrorism as a stand-alone offense is necessary. 
To take a more recent example, John Muhammad and Lee Boyd 
Malvo, known as the “D.C. snipers,” killed thirteen people over a 
three-week period in the Washington, D.C. area.71  They apparently, 
according to Malvo, sought to “terrorize” the nation.72  They were 
formally charged in Virginia with “an act of terrorism,” among other 
things.73  Given the number of victims, the number of potential 
victims, and the extended period over which the perpetrators 
randomly killed individuals, “terrorism” may seem appropriate under 
this “mosaic theory” of terrorism.74  Nevertheless, the localized nature 
of the shootings (their limit to the D.C. region) cuts against the 
application of the term.  In any case, premeditated murder would still 
cover these crimes.75 
Drilling down on what constitutes “terrorism” still does not 
adequately respond to the question of why a separate legal harm of 
“terrorism” needs to exist.  For example, to the extent that terrorism 
is a way to challenge political policies or programs,76 such means are 
clearly unlawful under any doctrine.  The eight German saboteurs 
who buried their uniforms in the sand upon arriving on the shores of 
                                                                                                                 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012). 
 70. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006). 
 71. See Larry O’Dell, D.C. Sniper Lee Boyd Malvo Wants Life Sentences Tossed, 
WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2013, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/27/dc-sniper-
malvo-wants-life-sentences-tossed/. 
 72. See C. Benjamin Ford, Malvo Says Pair Planned Bombings, GAZETTE.NET 
(May 24, 2006), http://ww2.gazette.net/stories/052406/germnew193052_31939.shtml /. 
 73. See Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 619 S.E.2d 16, 30 (Va. 2005). 
 74. See generally Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 311, 313–14 (2012) (explaining that, under the Fourth Amendment, 
the mosaic theory holds that “searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of 
steps rather than as individual steps”); id. at 314 (pursuant to the theory, courts are 
“aggregating conduct rather than looking to discrete steps”). 
 75. John Muhammad, the only adult of the two, was executed and would have 
been executed for the capital murder charge, irrespective of the terrorism charge. See 
Muhammad, 619 S.E.2d at 30 (noting that Muhammad was convicted of the two 
capital murder charges, only one of which was premised on terrorism). 
 76. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘terrorism’ means 
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents . . . .”). 
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Long Island and Florida, and who were on a mission to destroy 
American military capabilities and attack civilian stores, may have 
been engaged in instrumental terrorism.77  Yet their actions already 
are violations of the laws of war.78  Accordingly, why the need for 
terrorism?  To take another recent example, the Tsarnaev brothers 
detonated two bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, 
apparently in violent protest of American mistreatment of Muslims.79  
The surviving brother was charged with several offenses, perhaps the 
most serious of which were using of a weapon of mass destruction and 
the malicious destruction of property resulting in death,80 which both 
potentially carry the death penalty.81  If sufficient charges aside from 
terrorism exist, is not “terrorism” as a separate cognizable harm 
unnecessary or superfluous? 
The scale, random nature, and extended sphere of fear are 
attributes of terrorism, but still are not wholly satisfactory ways to 
separate terrorism from other crimes.  There are two reasons for 
including terrorism in federal law; the first is social and the second 
legal.  First, “terrorism” and “terrorist” are powerful social terms that 
signify society’s alienation of the perpetrator, indicating that the 
perpetrator is worthy of no other identity than that of “terrorist.”82  
To label someone a “terrorist” is to socially exile that person.  
Perhaps no other word in the current American lexicon carries as 
much power to effectuate society’s interest in marginalizing the 
perpetrator; “murderer,” or “sex offender,” for example, also declare 
society’s revulsion as to the perpetrator, but perhaps not to the 
degree of “terrorist.”  For Tsarnaev, being labeled a “user of a 
weapon of mass destruction” or “malicious destructor of property 
resulting in death” does not nearly have the same weight or social 
utility as “terrorist.” 
This theory on the relationship between terrorism and identity is 
not altogether new.  Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh 
stated after the 2005 London subway bombings, for example, “I do 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1942). 
 78. See id. at 12. 
 79. See Deborah Feyerick et al., Boston Bomb Suspect Pleads Not Guilty, CNN 
(July 11, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/10/us/boston-bombing-case. 
 80. Indictment, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13CR10200, 2013 WL 3215742 
(D. Mass. June 27, 2013). 
 81. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(4) (2012); id.  § 844(i). 
 82. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 23 (2006) (“‘[T]errorism’ is a 
pejorative term.”) Hodgson & Tadros, supra note 15, at 497 (noting that “terrorism” 
has a “condemnatory effect” in that it marks out an importantly distinctive wrong 
that has widespread public recognition). 
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believe that terrorism has no religion, terrorists have no religion and 
that they are a friend of no religion.  No religion in the world 
preaches atrocities against innocent men, women and children . . . .”83  
Similarly, following failed terrorist plots in London and Glasgow, Dr. 
Singh said, “A terrorist is a terrorist and has no religion or 
community.”84  Lieutenant Brian Murphy (retired), the first law 
enforcement officer to respond to the Oak Creek shooting, said of the 
perpetrator, “[H]e was at a temple, shooting at worshippers, old men, 
women, and children.  Who does that?  Who really does that?  He 
was not a human being at that point.  He was less than human.”85  To 
label an individual as a “terrorist” is to therefore strip the perpetrator 
of any other human identity and brand him as highly offensive of 
society’s most basic norms and rules.  Further, as Attorney General 
Holder said in Oak Creek, “this community witnessed the very worst 
of human kind.”86 
Social science on criminal defendants makes clear that informal 
social control—the practice of guiding individual behavior through 
interactions with society—helps reduce antisocial thoughts and 
actions, and in this respect helps an individual become a regular, non-
offending part of mainstream society.87  Social science further 
establishes that concepts of identity play a critical role in the post-
offense development of a criminal defendant.88  In branding an 
individual a “terrorist,” we may be indicating that the individual is no 
longer deserving of society’s informal support and that the starting 
point for any identity transformation of the individual must be the 
lowly and stigmatized identity of “terrorist.” 
Second, to make this social punishment effective and available to 
prosecutors, terrorism must be codified in law.89  “Terrorism” as a 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Joint Press Conference Between Tony Blair and Manmohan Singh, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES (Sept. 8, 2005), http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20050908065251/ 
number10.gov.uk/page8152. 
 84. Emily Wax, Indian Doctors Fear Bomb Plot Backlash, WASH. POST, July 6, 
2007, at A10. 
 85. Cal Fussman, Lieutenant Brian Murphy: What I’ve Learned, ESQUIRE (Dec. 
27, 2012), http://www.esquire.com/features/what-ive-learned/meaning-of-life-2013/ 
brian-murphy-sikh-temple-shooting-0113. 
 86. Holder, supra note 6, at 2. 
 87. See generally Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A 
Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918 (1997).  
 88. See John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from 
Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 12 (2001) (describing desistance as “a social transition 
that entails identity transformation . . . from an offender to a nonoffender”). 
 89. See Hodgson & Tadros, supra note 15, at 497 (noting that “terrorism” is 
designed to “trigger[] the use of terrorism law”). 
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legal concept reflects the great social disapproval of the underlying 
conduct and identifies violence that is in the highest level of harms to 
society and mankind.  For example, William Blackstone noted that “it 
is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should 
be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the 
public safety and happiness.”90   Terrorism is in that tier.  As one 
commentator writes, “States consider terrorism . . . a heinous crime 
on the order of a crime against humanity . . . .”91 
Criminal laws are all supported, as they must be, by the purposes of 
criminal punishment.  These are retribution (a form of social 
vengeance directed at the offender), just deserts (part of the bargain 
in the social contract wherein an individual who breaks the law 
consents to and is due punishment), deterrence (a social message that 
the offense will not be tolerated and thus should not be committed by 
others), incapacitation (a form of social control by removing the 
offender from society), and rehabilitation (a form of social investment 
in the improvement of the offender).92  Because of its heinous nature, 
terrorism may be a crime that we concede to be supported primarily 
by retributive reasons.93 
In short, “terror” historically has meant that which causes fright 
(the descriptive definition) and that which is calculated to cause fright 
(the instrumental definition).94  Though “terrorism” shares these fear-
based elements in common with other recognized crimes, terrorism 
may be distinguished in part by its scale, its indiscriminate nature, and 
the wider universe of individuals it potentially impacts,95 in contrast 
with incidents that target particular people or are localized.  As an 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against 
Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 57, 106 (2010); see also Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations on 
Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Law and Literature, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1110 
(2003) (“Crimes against humanity and terrorism are crimes of the first order.  They 
represent, along with genocide, the worst we mortals do to each other; that is to 
say . . . to ourselves.”). 
 92. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012) (listing the purposes of criminal sentencing). 
 93. See Laura K. Donohue, In the Name of National Security: U.S. 
Counterterrorist Measures, 1960–2000, 13 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 15 (2001) 
(“Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our 
policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.”); cf. Note, Responding to 
Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (2002) (suggesting 
that America’s response to terrorism after 9/11 may be supported by joint interests in 
retribution and incapacitation). 
 94. See supra notes 21–31 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
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initial matter, terrorism, unique in its scale, randomness, and impact, 
should be a separate category of harm because it allows society to 
alienate, and the law to apply a particularly robust set of laws against, 
the perpetrators of such especially harmful actions. 
II.  FEDERAL TERRORISM LAW 
A. Federal Definition of Terrorism 
Part I was intended to provide some conceptual background on 
what should constitute terrorism.  This Part is designed to address 
what counts as terrorism according to federal law.  A single or static 
definition of terrorism is difficult to pin down,96 a task complicated by 
the numerous definitions of and references to terrorism in federal 
law.97  An overarching principle in federal terrorism statutes may be 
found nonetheless: as explained more fully below, federal law 
generally requires that the act of violence be politically or socially 
motivated to be an act of terrorism. 
One federal statute, for example, provides that “the term 
‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.”98  Another states that “the term ‘Federal crime of 
terrorism’ means an [unlawful] offense that . . . is calculated to 
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or 
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,”99 and still 
another federal statute states that “international terrorism” means 
violent or dangerous criminal activities that “appear to be 
intended . . . to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence 
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten 
Years After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 6–7 n.12 (2011) (referring to scholars’ 
attempts to settle on a single definition of “terrorism” where a consensus, both 
internationally and domestically, on its meaning does not exist); Chris Good, What It 
Means to Call It ‘Terrorism’, ABC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
blogs/politics/2013/04/what-it-means-to-call-it-terrorism/ (quoting a former FBI 
counterterrorism official as saying, “There’s a number of different definitions for 
‘terrorism.’  There’s the academic definition, and there are the legal definitions, and 
then there’s the one that’s used by the FBI, which kind of straddles both.”). 
 97. See Setty, supra note 96, at 18 n.56 (citing Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous 
Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. 
LEGIS. 249, 249–50 (2004)) (explaining that there are “twenty-two definitions of 
terrorism under U.S. federal law”). 
 98. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012). 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012). 
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the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping.”100 
Accordingly, the most basic definition of terrorism in federal law, 
as a federal agency pointed out in a post-9/11 memorandum, is that 
“terrorism” “means criminal acts by individuals or 
groups . . . motivated by political or social agendas.”101  Many scholars 
and public figures seem to agree with this definition.  Bruce Hoffman, 
for example, suggests that terrorism is “the deliberate creation and 
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the 
pursuit of political change.”102  Anne-Marie Slaughter and William 
Burke-White likewise contend that “[t]error . . . is spread for a 
purpose, generally to advance or publicize a cause or to undermine 
public order as part of a political, ethnic, or religious struggle.”103  
Phillip Heymann writes that terrorism is “violence conducted as part 
of a political strategy by a subnational group or secret agents of a 
foreign state.”104  For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu finds that “[t]errorism is the deliberate and systematic 
assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends.”105  Thus, the 
federal government, supported by scholars and others, sees terrorism 
as predicated upon a particular motive. 
Federal conceptions of “terrorism” tend to emphasize not only 
political or social intent but also an interest in intimidating or 
coercing a civilian population.  The White House’s National Security 
Strategy, for example, notes that “[t]he goal of those who perpetrate 
terrorist attacks is in part to sow fear.”106  Similarly, speaking on the 
sentencing of a man for terrorism violations, a federal prosecutor 
announced that an act that “creates panic, chaos, and fear . . . is the 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. § 2331(1). 
 101. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 1. 
 102. HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 40. 
 103. Anne Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International 
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (2002). 
 104. PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE 
STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 6 (1998). 
 105. BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, FIGHTING TERRORISM: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN 
DEFEAT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 8 (1997). 
 106. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 22 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.p
df; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., THE SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY OF COMBATING TERRORISM 7 (2003), available at  http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-03-scitechterrorism.pdf 
(referring to the “fear and anxiety that terrorists seek to instill”). 
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definition of terrorism.”107  This intimidation or coercion strand of 
terrorism is but part of a federal definition of terrorism that is 
exclusively instrumental. 
This is not to suggest that the descriptive understanding of 
terrorism—in which “terror” means a state of fear or fright—has been 
wholly pushed out of the public consciousness.  It is not uncommon 
for political leaders to walk the line between the descriptive and 
instrumental view, careful to use the former in order to benefit from 
its weight and import without wading into the latter, technical area.108  
In recent months, American leaders have chastised individuals for 
“terrorizing” a community or the American people without claiming 
to make, or being held to, a definitive legal statement that an incident 
is an “act of terrorism.”109  For example, the morning after the 
Aurora, Colorado movie theater shooting, President Obama 
pondered why anyone would “terrorize their fellow human beings 
like this.”110   Rhetorical maneuvers aside, it is clear that the formal, 
federal definition of terrorism requires a discernible political or social 
motive before it comes into play. 
B. Application of the Federal Definition to Recent Events 
It may be helpful to see how the federal definition of terrorism 
applies to the four examples of recent mass violence briefly 
summarized at the outset of this Article.  First, the shooting in 
Aurora, Colorado, was aimed at a large number of people (i.e., the 
theater was packed for the premiere of a popular movie),111 
indiscriminate (i.e., Holmes did not seem to have any specific targets 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Zajac Sentenced to 35 Years in Federal 
Prison in Connection with Explosion at Salt Lake Library 2 (Apr. 14, 2011), available 
at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ut/news/2011/Zajac%20sentenced%20for%20library%20 
bombing.pdf. 
 108. See Abdullah, supra note 18. 
 109. President Obama is apparently aware of the need to be deliberate in one’s 
word choice.  As he famously said during the 2008 campaign, “Don’t tell me words 
don’t matter.” See Michael Luo, On Health Care, Affordability and 
Comprehensiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/ 
us/politics/22check.html. 
 110. Eyder Peralta, President Obama: ‘Such Violence, Such Evil Is Senseless; It’s 
Beyond Reason’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 20, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
blogs/thetwo-way/2012/07/20/157101106/president-obama-such-violence-such-evil-is-
senseless-its-beyond-reason. 
 111. See Erica Goode et al., Before Gunfire, Hints of ‘Bad News’, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 27, 2012, at A1 (noting that the movie theater was “sold out”). 
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in mind and was shooting individuals in the theater randomly),112 and 
premeditated (i.e., Holmes was heavily armed and carefully planned 
his attack for months, first filling the theater with smoke before 
peppering the crowd with bullets).113 
But the attack had no political or social agenda.  Holmes did not 
express, nor is there any meaningful evidence Holmes intended to 
effectuate, political or social change through violence.114  Instead, it 
seems that Holmes was a disaffected young man,115 and the requisite 
motive was lacking.  Thus, the terrorism designation would not 
apply—indeed, Holmes has not been charged with terrorism in 
federal court.116 
Due to the reprehensible nature of the shooting, some were 
outraged at Holmes117 and pondered whether the shooting should be 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See Dana Ford, Colorado Theater Shooting Suspect Offers to Plead Guilty, 
CNN (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/27/us/colorado-theater-shooting 
(“Witnesses who spoke to CNN said the gunman roamed the theater, shooting 
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 113. See Andre Tartar, Police: Colorado Shooter Planned Attack With 
‘Calculation and Deliberation’, N.Y. MAG. (July 22, 2012), http://nymag.com/daily/ 
intelligencer/2012/07/police-colorado-shooting-was-premeditated.html. 
Aurora Police Chief Dan Oates now says there is clear evidence that the 
rampage was planned with ‘calculation and deliberation.’  He points to the 
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(including 6,000 rounds of ammunition and a bulletproof vest purchased 
online) and the fact that he spent two months amassing a small arsenal—
consisting of a semi-automatic assault rifle, which jammed during the attack, 
two pistols, and a shotgun—from local stores. 
Id. 
 114. At most, it seems, Holmes may have gone on his rampage in response to his 
academic shortcomings. See John Ingold et al., DA: Holmes Made Threat at CU at 
Same Time He Failed, Bought Guns, DENVER POST, Aug. 24, 2012, http://www. 
denverpost.com/ci_21384695/prosecutor-alleged-theater-shooter-holmes-banned-
from-cu-june-threats. 
 115. See Nancy Dillon & James McShane, James Holmes, Aurora Shooting 
Suspect, Was Grad School Dropout and Loner, Say Neighbors, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
July 21, 2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/james-holmes-aurora-
shooting-suspect-med-school-dropout-loner-neighbors-article-
1.1118501#ixzz2ZbWAXi2q. 
 116. See Madison Gray, James Holmes Charged with 142 Counts, Including First-
Degree Murder, in Colorado Theater Shooting, TIME (July 30, 2012), 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/07/30/james-holmes-charged-with-142-counts-
including-first-degree-murder-in-colo-theater-shooting/#ixzz2ZbX1h9ce 
(“Holmes . . . was formally charged with 24 counts of first-degree murder and 116 
counts of attempted murder . . . as well as one charge of using a crime enhancer and 
one of possessing an explosive device.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Mark Brown, Some See Accused Killer James Holmes as the Face of 
Evil, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 23, 2012, http://www.suntimes.com/news/brown/13957656-
452/some-see-accused-killer-james-holmes-as-the-face-of-evil.html. 
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considered terrorism.118  Calling the shooting an act of terrorism 
would allow the social alienation and legal consequences to flow from 
this designation.  In truth, following the rampage, I argued that “the 
crime Mr. Holmes is accused of—the cold, calculated shooting of 
innocents in a movie theater—qualifies as terrorism and its 
perpetrator as a terrorist.”119  These and similar social judgments 
aside, federal law would not hold that Holmes committed an act of 
terrorism because there was no evidence of a cognizable political or 
social motive. 
Next, turning to the shooting of worshippers at a Sikh temple in 
Oak Creek, Wisconsin, the number of potential targets was high (i.e., 
the congregation has approximately 400 members).120  Further, Page 
shot in cold blood six individuals in an indiscriminate fashion (i.e., not 
targeting anyone specifically, but gunning down anyone present in the 
temple or on temple grounds).121  In addition, Page reportedly had 
visited the temple before,122 suggesting premeditation. 
But Page’s motive is still unknown,123 preventing any firm 
conclusion that the incident was motivated by a political or social 
purpose, a necessary element of “terrorism” under existing federal 
law.124  As the Oak Creek Chief of Police admitted, “I don’t know that 
we’ll ever know, because when he died [from a self-inflicted gunshot 
                                                                                                                 
 118. See Greenwald, supra note 14. 
 119. Dawinder S. Sidhu, Colorado Shooter Was a Terrorist, BALT. SUN, July 24, 
2012, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-colorado-shooting-
terrorism-20120724,0,285198.story. 
 120. See Eric Toner, Sikhs Grieve After Deadly Temple Shooting, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Aug. 06, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/06/158232623/sikhs-
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 121. See Mike Lillis, Dem Lawmaker Wants the White House to Investigate 
Violence Against Sikhs, HILL (Aug. 9, 2012), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/ 
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 122. See Henry Rosoff, Southern Poverty Law Center Releases Report on Sikh 
Temple Gunman, FOX6NOW.COM (Nov. 27, 2012), http://fox6now.com/ 
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(“Page reportedly visited the Sikh Temple at least once before the shooting.”). 
 123. This paragraph and the remainder of this subpart are based, in part, on 
Dawinder S. Sidhu, Lessons on Terrorism and “Mistaken Identity,” from Oak Creek, 
With a Coda on the Boston Marathon Bombings, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 76, 
79–80, 82–83, 88 (2013). 
 124. Indeed, speaking at a hearing on domestic terrorism and hate crimes 
convened by the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human 
Rights, a Department of Homeland Security official acknowledged that the Oak 
Creek shooting “was carried out by an individual with a history of involvement in the 
white supremacist extremist movement, although his motives remain unknown.” 
MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 6. 
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wound], . . . what his motive was or what he was thinking [died with 
him].”125  It is true that Page, the shooter, was an avowed white 
supremacist and had invited likeminded individuals to “get involved 
and become active.”126  While Page’s involvement with the organized 
white supremacy movement may provide some measure of 
circumstantial evidence of the requisite motive,127 this constitutionally 
protected speech and association does not automatically convert his 
behavior, however violent, into actionable bias or ideologically 
motivated conduct.128  The Federal Bureau of Investigation itself 
reported, after its investigation, that “[n]o evidence was uncovered to 
conclude this attack was directed or facilitated by any white 
supremacist group.”129  The mass shooting had a large number of 
potential targets, was indiscriminate, and was apparently 
premeditated,  which all cut in favor of the terrorism label.  But the 
absence of an identifiable motive prevents the terrorism designation 
from applying.  Attorney General Holder’s comment, made at a 
memorial for the Oak Creek victims, that “what happened” was “an 
act of terrorism,”130 is difficult to square with this straightforward 
analysis.131 
Moving on to Newtown, the shooter, Adam Lanza, shot his mother 
in the head four times at home, damaged his computer hard drive in 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Elaine Quijano, Question of Motive Remains in Sikh Temple Shooting, CBS 
NEWS (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57488654/question-of-
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 126. Scott Bauer & Todd Richmond, Gunman in Sikh Temple Attack Was White 
Supremacist, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 6, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/gunman-
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 127. See United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1373–74 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding 
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 128. See United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1316 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting 
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unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal 
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privileges solely because of a citizen’s association with an unpopular organization.”). 
 129. Oak Creek Sikh Temple Shooting Investigation Conclusion, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/milwaukee/press-releases/2012/ 
oak-creek-sikh-temple-shooting-investigation-conclusion. 
 130. Holder, supra note 6, at 2. 
 131. See Sidhu, supra note 123, at 77–81. 
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an apparent effort to foil investigators and cover his tracks, and then 
proceeded to the elementary school where his mother volunteered, 
killing twenty-six people, including twenty children, with a 
semiautomatic weapon.132  Lanza shot innocent individuals 
indiscriminately and did so with premeditation.133  The shooting 
arguably warrants the “terrorism” designation under law and the 
strong social disapproval that the “terrorism” label necessary 
provokes, especially as Lanza shot each of the children multiple 
times, with some children shot as many as eleven times.134 
The absence of motive, however, blocks the legal and social 
consequences from attending this case.  In a Washington Post article 
aptly entitled “A Frustrating Search for Motive in Newtown 
Shootings,” a Connecticut police department spokesperson admitted 
that “we don’t have any smoking gun to say this is why it occurred.”135  
Accordingly, under prevailing federal law, Lanza’s actions would not 
be deemed “terrorism.” 
Finally, and most recently, Boston.  The bombings could have 
killed scores of individuals (i.e., there were hundreds of individuals 
crossing, or watching, the finish line).136  The bombings were 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See Michael S. Schmidt, Killer’s Mother Was Shot 4 Times, Official Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/nyregion/lanzas-mother-
shot-4-times-in-head-medical-examiner-says.html (describing these facts, noting that 
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 135. Marc Fisher et al., A Frustrating Search for Motive in Newtown Shootings, 
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indiscriminate (i.e., no specific individuals were targeted).137  There 
can be no doubt that the bombings were premeditated, as they 
necessarily required advance planning and deliberation.138 
The day after the attack, before we even knew who was responsible 
for the bombings, let alone why the bombings were committed, 
President Obama declared the attack “an act of terrorism.”139  As 
terrorism under federal law must be predicated upon the motive of 
the perpetrator, President Obama’s statement in the absence of any 
knowledge of perpetrators or the motive was, at the time, an 
improper statement of law. 
Subsequently, of course, it was discovered that the bombings were 
the work of the Tsarnaev brothers.140  Moreover, and importantly, 
news reports indicated that the bombings were the brothers’ response 
to alleged American mistreatment of Muslims.  To erase any doubt as 
to the purpose of the bombings, the surviving brother, Dzhokhar, 
scribbled the following on the inside of the boat as he laid in the 
backyard of an area home: 
The U.S. Government is killing our innocent civilians . . . . I can’t 
stand to see such evil unpunished . . . .We Muslims are one body, 
you hurt one you hurt us all . . . . Now I don’t like killing innocent 
people it is forbidden in Islam but due to said [unintelligible] it is 
allowed . . . . Stop killing our innocent people and we will stop.141 
It would seem therefore that the requisite intent is present for 
federal terrorism charges to apply to Tsarnaev.  Curiously, however, 
federal prosecutors have not charged Tsarnaev with committing an 
act of terrorism.142 
The Boston bombings highlight the inconsistent and perhaps 
incoherent nature of terrorism’s definition in federal law and 
application to incidents of mass violence.  The President, without 
knowledge of motive, makes a clear statement that the attack 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See Editorial, In Boston, One Act of Evil, Thousands of Acts of Humanity, 
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constituted an act of terrorism, and when that motive is known, the 
federal authorities fail to lodge any terrorism charges.143  At the same 
time that the federal position was changing or evolving, the people 
themselves were attempting to grapple with whether the terrorism 
designation was appropriate in this instance.144  The need for clarity in 
understanding when terrorism has occurred is therefore critical and 
this need has been underscored by recent events and subsequent 
uncertainties.  The remainder of the Article discusses whether an 
appreciation for space can bring us closer to a reliable and consistent 
concept of terrorism. 
III.  A SPATIAL MODEL OF TERRORISM 
A. The Relevance of Space 
Context matters, as the Supreme Court has said many times and in 
various doctrinal areas.145  This Part explains why the context of space 
should matter in determining whether terrorism has taken place. 
The notion that space is relevant in legal analysis is not new.  This 
notion is beyond the obvious realms of property (e.g., the legal right 
to exclusive use of certain lands or water),146 privacy (e.g., shared 
understandings of personal or spatial integrity),147 and extraterritorial 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Compare Boston Bombings: Obama Condemns ‘Act of Terrorism’, supra note 
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jurisdiction (e.g., the applicability of legal provisions beyond areas 
over which the United States has de jure sovereignty).148 
In the First Amendment realm, for example, the extent to which an 
individual’s speech is protected may depend on where he or she is 
speaking.  The Court has instructed, “To ascertain what limits, if any, 
may be placed on protected speech, we have often focused on the 
‘place’ of that speech, considering the nature of the forum the speaker 
seeks to employ . . . .”149  “[T]he standards by which limitations on 
speech must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the 
property at issue,” the Court continued.150  Indeed, an individual 
speaking in a “traditional public forum” (i.e., public space that has 
been traditionally used for expressive conduct and that the 
government has intentionally dedicated for expressive conduct)151 is 
generally entitled to greater constitutional protection than if the 
speech were to take place in a “non-public forum” (i.e., public space 
that the government has neither dedicated nor opened up for 
expressive conduct)152—even if the same individual engages in the 
same exact speech in both areas.  Space is thus relevant in delineating 
the meaning of First Amendment protection, though the underlying 
speech or expressive conduct is otherwise equal in all other respects. 
Similarly, the distinctive characteristics of prisons generally call for 
distinctive legal rules.  The Supreme Court, for example, observed 
that a correctional facility is “a unique place fraught with serious 
security dangers.”153  Other social spaces have drawn the Court’s 
attention for their unique attributes.  The Court, in a memorable 
opinion by Justice Fortas, acknowledged the “special characteristics 
of the school environment,” rejecting nonetheless any suggestion that 
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“students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”154  Of course, there are 
other examples as well.155 
The question becomes whether considerations of space also should 
play a role in a legal determination as to whether terrorism has taken 
place.  To demonstrate the propriety of taking space into account for 
purposes of assessing whether terrorism has occurred, one need look 
no further than cities—the spaces that serve as centers for civic and 
political affairs, in which people are heavily concentrated relative to 
other areas, and that facilitate commercial and social exchange 
between otherwise non-connected individuals.156 
In describing the special qualities of cities, Lyn Lofland, for 
example, refers to a city as “the locus of a peculiar social situation: the 
people to be found within its boundaries at any given moment know 
nothing personally about the vast majority of others with whom they 
share this space.”157  Jerry Frug similarly notes that cities “put people 
in contact, whether they like it or not, with men and women who have 
values, opinions, or desires that they find unfamiliar, strange, even 
offensive.”158  Further, Frug explains, cities are characterized by 
“[s]ocial differentiation without exclusion[,] mean[ing] the formation 
of a multiplicity of group affinities . . . in an atmosphere that 
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promotes their intermingling.”159  Cities, he writes, are permeable 
because they are “open to anyone whatsoever,” and the sort of 
intellectual and cultural intercourse that a city fosters “provides 
exposure to opinions and cultures very different from one’s own.”160  
Arguably, then, cities offer the space where democracy—from 
informal debates to institutional policymaking—and the market—
from a bustling bazaar to a sophisticated securities exchange—are 
most alive.  All of this is made possible by a robust, hard 
infrastructure, including public transportation systems (e.g., subway), 
roads, sewers, water works, and digital soft infrastructures that 
facilitate commerce and everyday information-sharing in cafés, offices 
and other settings.161 
The open, accessible nature of cities is highlighted by New York 
City’s response to 9/11.  Very shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
that defied our imagination162 and devastated the nation,163 New York 
City, the city most affected by the attacks, expressly invited 
individuals to visit.  The then-mayor of New York City, Rudolph 
Giuliani, instituted a campaign to encourage others to experience the 
city’s sights and sounds.  “I urge everyone to come visit New York,” 
he said.164  Another official made clear that the post-9/11 “message” 
from the city was that “we were open for business.”165 
The aforementioned virtues of a city—its diverse and fluid 
population, political centrality, cultural and artistic offerings, 
economic energy, critical infrastructure, and openness—also make it 
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an attractive site for a terrorist attack.  Indeed, a city may be targeted 
by terrorists precisely because of its accessibility (i.e., the ability to 
enter a city and blend in), the practical impact that an attack may 
have on its civic and social life, the vast amount of potential victims, 
and the symbolic value of attacking a prominent landmark or 
geographical area.166  It therefore may not come as a surprise that 
major cities, including Boston,167 New York,168 London,169 Madrid,170 
Mumbai,171 Moscow,172 and Tokyo,173 have suffered and absorbed 
terrorist attacks. 
The case of New York City particularly demonstrates terrorists’ 
propensity to target cities.  Aside from well-known incidents, such as 
the 1993174 and 2001175 attacks on the World Trade Center, and the 
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failed 2010 Times Square bombing,176 New York City has been 
targeted a significant number of times in recent years: according to 
the deputy commissioner of the New York Police Department in 
roughly a three-month span in 2007, there were “22 bomb threats and 
31 intelligence leads related to subway attack[s]” alone.177  At least 
thirteen specific terror plots against New York City have been 
foiled,178 the official disclosed, including a plot to bomb the New York 
Stock Exchange.179 
A cost of the human, cultural, and financial flux that a city offers, 
and of the openness required to facilitate that ongoing flow of 
residents, consumers, businessmen, etc., is the possibility that an 
unsavory person or persons may use the same avenue for entry and 
enjoy the cover of relative anonymity to plot and implement a violent 
attack against innocents.  The United States is an open society, 
particularly in cities; and that national virtue, which reflects our 
democratic and immigrant nature, creates both penetrability and 
opportunity for anti-social actors.  The day after the 9/11 atrocities, 
Michael R. Gordon of the New York Times wrote that the terrorists 
“used the very accessibility of an open society to wound that 
society.”180  Referring to the special circumstances of space, Gordon 
noted that “[i]t is relatively easy to defend a military base or fortified 
bunker,” but “virtually impossible to insulate all . . . government 
buildings and commercial centers against a suicide attacker.”181  For 
abusing and exploiting the vulnerability of our open society, some 
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may agree with Gordon’s assessment that the attacks of 9/11, when 
compared to others, were especially “sinister.”182  As New York City 
and the 9/11 attacks demonstrate, space, and cities are relevant in the 
terrorism context. 
B. Space and Terrorism 
If space matters when it comes to determining whether terrorism 
has occurred, the question becomes how considerations of space 
merge with, or otherwise relate to, the two principal reasons for 
codifying terrorism as an independent cognizable harm: enabling 
society to express its strong disapproval of the underlying conduct by 
way of branding the perpetrator a “terrorist,” and allowing the law to 
give effect to this social judgment by way of imposing severe 
punishments on the perpetrator.  These purposes appear especially 
salient when an incident of mass violence occurs in a city 
environment. 
First, an individual who targets an area huddled with innocents is 
more deserving of the social stigma and identity of a terrorist than 
one who commits the same underlying act in an area with a lower 
concentration of innocents.  A bombing along a crowded city 
sidewalk or a busy subway station is qualitatively different than a 
bombing in space that is less crowded and open to individuals because 
of the significant number of innocents that may be implicated.  The 
diversity and fluidity of the innocents in a city only, who may be from 
different nations, religions, and backgrounds, widens the universe of 
individuals who may be impacted.  A target location that is more 
homogenous, sparsely populated, and less inviting to outsiders, by 
contrast, may have a smaller net of potential direct and indirect 
victims. 
Second, a legal charge of terrorism allows these social benefits to 
flow and enables the government to join and echo the social judgment 
that the perpetrator has committed a particularly heinous crime 
worthy of the full weight of legal punishments.183  It is true that a 
perpetrator of an attack on innocents in a city could be charged with 
other offenses, such as the use of a weapon of mass destruction, which 
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was one of the charges against the surviving Tsarnaev brother.184  One 
charged with that offense could face the death penalty.185  
Accordingly, one may argue that the legal punishment that Tsarnaev 
may receive pursuant to a terrorism charge would be no “better” than 
the punishment that would attach to other charges.  While the 
technical sentence could be identical, in modern times the label of 
“terrorist,” when affixed by society and firmly secured by the law, 
carries with it a unique and special meaning that perhaps is unlike any 
label that other possible charges could convey or signify.186  
Accordingly, the purposes of having terrorism as an independent 
legal harm appear to be furthered by an appreciation for the spatial 
dimensions of a given act. 
Naturally, the question may arise whether incidents in other areas, 
aside from cities, may similarly point towards the terrorism 
designation when premeditated mass violence indiscriminately 
directed at innocents takes place within them.  Though an exhaustive 
exploration of every setting in a society is impracticable, it is possible 
to identify other areas that may call for the terrorism designation if a 
premeditated, indiscriminate act of mass violence happens in that 
physical context. 
To be sure, incidents do not automatically become “terrorism” 
when they take place within the confines of a city.  It is the attributes 
of a city, not the municipal borders or responsibilities, which matter.  
Instead, the high composition and fluid nature of the population are 
what lends space within a city to the terrorism designation.  
Accordingly, in examining other potential spaces that may draw 
heightened attention in a terrorism analysis, it is necessary to look to 
these practical attributes instead of technical formalisms. 
Other physical settings exist that share the critical characteristics of 
cities.  Certain places of public accommodation, such as restaurants, 
hotels, entertainment venues, and sporting arenas, generally contain 
many people and are open to a wide assortment of different people.  
Accordingly, an attack in one of these places would have more 
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potential victims.  Moreover, these areas may be open to 
heterogeneous populations and the chilling effect on future patronage 
may be high as well.  These factors may help explain why terrorists 
have demonstrated an interest in targeting certain places of public 
accommodation, such as the Taj Mahal Place Hotel in Mumbai,187 a 
pizzeria in Jerusalem,188 a beachfront restaurant in Haifa, Israel,189 and 
a café in Marrakeh.190  Again, the key to such an analysis of whether 
an attack may deserve the terrorism label must hinge on the actual 
facts of the situation—e.g., whether the location generally has a large, 
fluid public presence—not whether it qualifies as a “place of public 
accommodation” under the law.191  Indeed, a restaurant that is heavily 
frequented is qualitatively different than one that is not, even if they 
both fall within the meaning of a place of public accommodation 
more broadly. 
Other spaces may warrant special attention to determine whether 
terrorism charges should apply, even if the essential spatial elements 
discussed thus far—significant, fluid population—are not present.  
These places are those accorded constitutional significance, such as 
places of worship192 or civic associations,193 and those that are essential 
to the operation of the democracy itself, such as government 
buildings, schools, or polling booths. 
In short, under the aforementioned rubric: 
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“Terrorism” means premeditated violence perpetrated 
indiscriminately against innocents.  Factors that may support the 
terrorism designation are whether the violence was— 
(a) perpetrated in 
(1) an area with a high concentration of innocents (e.g., 
a city or place of public accommodation), 
(2) a public area of constitutional significance wherein 
individuals congregate or associate, or 
(3) an area essential to the operation of the government 
wherein individuals work, engage in official 
government business, or are educated, or 
(b) calculated to further a political, religious, or social agenda. 
Note that subsection (a) comports with the overlooked descriptive 
meaning of terrorism, and (b) with the dominant instrumental view of 
terrorism.  This paradigm allows for both conceptions of terrorism to 
be activated. 
There is some precedence in federal law for this special 
consideration of space in the context of mass violence.  For example, 
18 U.S.C. § 2332f makes it unlawful for anyone to “deliver[], place[], 
discharge[], or detonate[] an explosive or other lethal device in, into, 
or against a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public 
transportation system, or an infrastructure facility . . . with the intent 
to cause death or serious bodily injury.”194  But a violation of this 
statute is not, within the text of the statute, “terrorism.”195  
Accordingly, it is not a vehicle for the powerful social term for 
terrorism.  Section 2332f would better reflect the proposal in this 
Article if it expressly defined violations as acts of “terrorism.  That 
said, this statute does demonstrate that, in federal law, special 
consideration of space in the context of mass violence already 
exists.196 
The spatial formulation of terrorism in this Article includes motive, 
an otherwise fundamental component of terrorism definitions in 
current federal law, only as a supplement to the core definition.197  
While a definition of terrorism that requires evidence of motive 
comports with an instrumental understanding of terrorism, the 
purposes of the terrorism designation—to signal society’s significant 
disapproval of a given incident of mass violence because of the 
                                                                                                                 
 194. 18 U.S.C. § 2332f(a) (2012). 
 195. See id. 
 196. See generally § 2332(f)(a). 
 197. See supra Part II.A. 
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intentional targeting of innocents on a large scale, and to enable the 
government to formally sanction the perpetrator by way of law—are 
satisfied irrespective of why the perpetrator committed the 
underlying act.  Indeed, an act of mass violence kills, maims, injures, 
chills, and psychologically scars those immediately present, those in 
and around the targeted area, and those connected to the victims 
regardless of whether the perpetrator’s motive was political, social, or 
religious, or whether there was any motive at all.  There are also 
evidentiary problems with resting the application of terrorism on 
motive.  In some instances, such as with the Oak Creek and Newtown 
incidents, motive cannot be ascertained because the perpetrators died 
(more specifically, killed themselves) at the scene.198  To allow the 
perpetrators the ability to escape the powerful social and legal term of 
“terrorist” because they killed innocents without revealing their 
motive would be to withdraw from the people and the government a 
meaningful means by which to sanction the perpetrator of a horrific 
crime. 
At the end of the day, the impact is not predicated or dependent 
upon the reasoning of the perpetrator, whether it is available or not.  
And it is the impact on targeted innocents that lies at the foundation 
of the strong social distaste for terrorism and the attendant legal 
punishment.199  In this sense, the terrorism definition proposed here 
incorporates an appreciation for what happened, not necessarily why 
it happened. 
To be sure, this does not mean that there is no room for motive in a 
terrorism analysis.  Rather, this Article suggests that terrorism as a 
social and legal construct does not require motive in order to be 
activated.  In other words, under this proposed scheme, motive would 
add nuance to, but not be the touchstone for, the definition of 
terrorism. 
For two reasons, under this proposal, motive-based terrorism 
constitutes a statutory subsection instead of the whole provision.  
First, practically speaking, completely omitting motive-based 
terrorism may be too drastic.  Second, there is value in allowing 
society and the law to condemn harms premised on motive.  A person 
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who commits an act of mass violence against innocents for political 
purposes not only injures individuals by way of his or her actions (an 
objective harm), but undermines the political process that exists to 
resolve such political disputes (an instrumental harm).200  By the same 
token, killing innocents in a violent premeditated attack is not only a 
wrong in itself (an objective harm), but, when done in the context of a 
political conflict, may be especially worthy of condemnation because 
it undermines how violence is to be conducted within the bounds of 
the laws of war.201  Accordingly, this formulation does not sever 
motive from terrorism, but includes it as a subsidiary arm of a broader 
terrorism definition. 
The importance of coercion or intimidation found in traditional 
notions of terrorism is not lost in the proposed definition either.202  
Rather, coercion and intimidation may be assumed to be inherent 
aspects and consequences of an act of mass violence directed at 
innocents instead of elements of the offense to be supported by 
evidence.  One need not have proof of intent to impose undue 
pressures on the victims; those external forces are there by virtue of 
the deed itself.  It may be argued that motive to coerce or intimidate 
still must be known because the targets must be aware of exactly what 
they are being compelled to do, or not do, by way of the violent 
influence.  Yet an identifiable motive is not necessary to cause terror, 
coerce, intimidate, or otherwise trigger emotion-based changes in 
behavior.  For example, in the aftermath of the Oak Creek shooting 
at a Sikh temple, members of the Sikh community nationwide were 
put on edge, even though the motive behind the Oak Creek attack 
was a mystery (and remains so today).203  That the immediate and 
wider Sikh community was placed in a state of terror speaks to the 
accomplishment of an emotional response irrespective of an 
identifiable motive.204  Accordingly, a model of terrorism that focuses 
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on conditions and facts, rather than intent, may still contemplate and 
encompass the emotion-based reactions that may be seen by some to 
be critical to the appropriateness of the terrorism label. 
In applying this suggested rubric, each of the four recent incidents 
described at the start of this Article would be considered an act of 
terrorism.  First, the shooting at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, 
satisfies the proposed definition because it was premeditated and an 
indiscriminate targeting of innocents.205  For good measure, it was at a 
place of public accommodation at which many innocents were 
present.206  As these factors, by themselves, would tip the balance in 
favor of the terrorism designation, the fact that James Holmes’s 
motive is unknown207 would not have, as it does today, preclusive 
effect over the potential application of federal terrorism laws.208  
Second, the shooting at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, was 
an act of terrorism under this proposed framework because it was 
premeditated and an indiscriminate targeting of innocents.209  Should 
there be any doubt about whether the incident qualifies as terrorism, 
it may be pointed out that the incident took place at a setting—a 
place of worship where individuals gather to exercise their religion—
afforded special protection in the Constitution.210  The failure to know 
why Wade Michael Page went on the shooting rampage does not 
prevent the terrorism label from applying here, as the other factors 
get us over the hump.211  Third, the shooting at the elementary school 
in Newtown, Connecticut, is terrorism within the meaning of this 
proposed framework because it was a premeditated and 
indiscriminate killing of innocents, including children.212  Further, the 
shooting took place at a school, one of the spaces in American society 
that, because of the importance of education, holds special value in 
our constitutional scheme.213  Fourth, the Boston Marathon bombing 
is terrorism because it was a premeditated and indiscriminate 
targeting of innocents.214  In addition, the bombing took place in a 
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major city at a major event, when the number of potential victims 
would be particularly high and the fluidity of the people particularly 
pronounced.215 
With respect to the benefits of such a construction, the primary 
advantages are its clarity and consistency, which are currently lacking 
in the federal definition of terrorism.216  The present state of 
confusion in the terrorism laws is perhaps best demonstrated by the 
response to the Boston bombings, where the President first claimed 
the bombings were a terrorist attack without knowing who committed 
the attack, or why, in contravention of the terrorism laws’ 
requirement of motive.  Once it came to light that the motive was 
political and religious in nature, which would seem to satisfy terrorism 
laws, the surviving brother was not charged with a terrorism offense. 
Moreover, the definition, because of its descriptive component, 
truly captures the nature of terrorist activity today.  Philip Bobbitt, 
for example, observes that al-Qaeda “does not simply want to seize 
the governing apparatus of a particular national state,” but also 
“attempts to achieve a constant state of terror.”217  That is, modern 
terrorism is not only a “technique” to provoke political change, 
Bobbitt notes, but “an end in itself.”218  It is, in other words, 
instrumental and descriptive.  The dual definition of terrorism aligns 
with this reality. 
Further, it promotes the purposes of having independent terrorism 
laws in the first place.  Indeed, this formulation, which looks to 
descriptive action, not just instrumental intent, allows the social and 
legal consequences to flow even if the perpetrator’s reasoning is kept 
within the confines of his or her twisted brain.  In this sense, a 
descriptive focus places the facts in charge of whether those social and 
legal consequences will be activated.  By contrast, a perpetrator 
currently can enjoin those consequences by dying and joining the 
bloodshed at the scene.  Page and Lanza, for example, both killed 
themselves in the course of their mass shootings.219  Their suicides 
should not entitle these perpetrators to the windfall of avoiding the 
label of “terrorists,” or from enabling society thereafter from 
properly conceptualizing what happened.  A formulation driven by 
facts and objective action is thus preferable to one dependent solely 
upon subjective intent. 
                                                                                                                 
 215. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 217. PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 62 (2008). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Quijano, supra note 125; Simpson et al., supra note 4. 
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In addition, this proposed definition reduces the possibility that the 
terrorism designation will be premised upon the racial or religious 
identity of the perpetrator.  At present, there is a sense that 
individuals from certain countries or religious traditions, primarily 
Muslims, will be more likely to be found to be terrorists than 
individuals from other communities.220  If terrorism is grounded in 
action, there is a diminished opportunity for intent to be reflexively 
inferred from identity and for any one group to be presumptively 
deemed terrorists.  With an overview of the contents of the proposed 
definition and its potential benefits, it is now appropriate to refine the 
contours of the definition. 
IV.  CLARIFYING THOUGHTS 
This proposed shift in definitions of terrorism—precipitated by an 
understanding that space is relevant and supportive of an objective or 
descriptive terrorism paradigm—will invariably provoke questions 
and concerns.  The final Part of this Article responds to six 
anticipated counterarguments. 
First, there is the “dilution” counterargument.  Four out of four 
incidents—Aurora, Oak Creek, Newtown, and Boston—would 
qualify as terrorism under the Article’s proposed framework, where 
the outcome would be different under the existing paradigm.  
Accordingly, some may claim that the suggested definition of 
terrorism is too generous, and that the significance of terrorism will 
be lost or minimized as to incidents to which it should be applied.221  
In response to that argument, I note that, under the current regime, 
the social and legal reasons for having independent terrorism laws are 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Race Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial 
Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1311 (2004) (“[B]ecause the 
logic of post-September 11 hate violence depends upon a substitution of anyone 
‘Muslim-looking’ for the terrorists, the claims of loyalty are more troubling; once this 
substitution is made, it is all ‘Muslim-looking’ people, and not merely the nineteen 
terrorists, who are presumptively disloyal.”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the 
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002) (“September 11 facilitated the 
consolidation of a new identity category that groups together persons who appear 
‘Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.’  This consolidation reflects a racialization 
wherein members of this group are identified as terrorists, and are disidentified as 
citizens.”). 
 221. See generally Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now? The Misuse of 
the Civil Suit Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533 (2013) 
(expressing concern with the overbreadth of a federal terrorism law); Chantal 
Tortoroli, Note, Gangs of New York Are Terrorists? The Misapplication of the New 
York Antiterrorism Statute Due to the Lack of Comprehensive Gang Legislation, 84 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 391 (2010) (same with respect to a state terrorism law). 
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left unfulfilled.  The definition of terrorism under federal law—
anchored in subjective motivation and without any textual allowance 
for geographic variation—is underutilized and fosters inconsistent 
results.  Indeed, individuals already believe that the four examples 
provided in this Article should be considered terrorism—President 
Obama has said as much with respect to Boston, Attorney General 
Holder with respect to Oak Creek, and commentators have said as 
much with respect to Aurora and Newtown.  Concerns about an 
increase in terrorism designations in raw terms should give way to an 
appreciation for the remedied mismatch between terrorism laws’ 
unsatisfactory and confusing outcomes, on one hand, and the 
underlying purposes for those laws in the first place and prevailing 
social judgments, on the other.  At this point, anxiety that the 
terrorism designation will be overinclusive and that the terrorism 
label will lose its effect are speculative.222  In any case, it seems 
unlikely that a term that remains so powerful in modern society will 
somehow have little force when applied to random mass violence in 
which innocents are targeted and/or killed. 
Second, there is the “limiting principles” counterargument.  If 
terrorism is not restrained by the existence of subjective motive, what, 
some may ask, prevents terrorism from extending to effectively all 
senseless violence?  There are several factors, however, that refine 
and focus terrorism to an act which is 1) premeditated, 2) 
indiscriminate, 3) violent, that is 4a) in a public location i) with a high 
concentration of individuals, ii) with constitutional significance, or iii) 
that is essential to the operation of the government, or 4b) calculated 
to further a political, religious, or social agenda.  These factors can 
help distinguish terrorism from other acts of violence. 
Third, the “indeterminacy” counterargument is based on the 
concern that, while these aforementioned factors may, in theory, 
regulate when a particular incident is terrorism, the factors 
themselves are insufficiently defined and lead to arbitrary and 
inconsistent application.  The factors have workable definitions that 
may guide their reliable and even-handed application.  
                                                                                                                 
 222. A broader definition of terrorism may trigger real concerns over expanded 
executive power in times of war. See Hodgson & Tadros, supra note 15, at 497 (“The 
body of terrorism law consists of an extended set of state powers that apply where 
terrorism is concerned.  The definition of terrorism determines when these powers 
are triggered.”).  We should be mindful of such executive abuse, though it is curious 
that the executive has failed to take advantage of that additional power when the 
opportunity has presented itself.  In the Tsarnaev case, for example, federal 
prosecutors, under the direction of the Attorney General, could have charged the 
surviving Tsarnaev brother with terrorism, but did not. 
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“Premeditated,” for example, is an established term in criminal law.223  
A killing made in the heat of the moment or without the proper 
consideration would thus fall below the threshold culpability required 
for terrorism.224  This is not to suggest that there are no problems with 
“premeditation” as a technical term,225 but at the end of the day, 
“premeditation” signals a state of mind that is particularly culpable,226 
where the underlying action is supported by some measure of 
reflection.227  “Indiscriminate” simply denotes that the violence is 
against random, indistinguishable individuals.228  Article 51 of the 
Geneva Conventions, for example, prohibits “indiscriminate attacks” 
and notes that they strike individuals “without distinction.”229  
Accordingly, an indiscriminate killing has no specific targets, and fails 
to consider potential victims as separate individuals.  A mass shooting 
in which the perpetrator sprays an area with bullets to kill one or two 
specific individuals is a targeted killing and, by definition, is not 
indiscriminate, even if the carnage extends beyond the specific 
targets.  A workplace shooting by a disgruntled ex-employee230 or a 
                                                                                                                 
 223. See, e.g., CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 8.20 (Deliberate and Premeditated Murder) 
(Thomson Reuters, Westlaw updated Sept. 2013) (providing that 
“premeditation . . . means considered beforehand”); see id. (“[The] intent on the part 
of the defendant to kill . . . must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection . . . . 
The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection.”). 
 224. See, e.g., id. (providing that premeditated murder does not include murder 
which is committed “under a sudden heat of passion” or which is the product of “a 
mere unconsidered and rash impulse”). 
 225. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES 100 (1931) (expressing concern about the “mystifying cloud of words” 
such as “deliberation” and “premeditation,” adding that the difference between the 
two is “so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly be expected to 
assimilate and understand it”). 
 226. See id. at 100 (indicating that a “lesser degree” offense is an “exercise of 
mercy” by the jury). 
 227. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 551 (providing that “to ‘premeditate’ 
means ‘to think about beforehand’”).  Requiring “premeditation” is to serve as a 
limiting principle on the application of the terrorist label.  That said, to the extent 
that “premeditation” may be sufficiently problematic, alternative regimes serving the 
same purpose may be considered.  One alternative is to reserve the terrorist 
designation for murder committed “by certain means, such as by bombing, or poison, 
or lying in wait, or torture.” Matthew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 145, 166 (1999).  Another is to “leav[e] to courts and juries some 
discretion to decide which murders are the most grievous and deserving of society’s 
worst condemnation.” Id. at 166–67. 
 228. See Begorre-Bret, supra note 61, at 1996. 
 229. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
art. 51.4, June 8, 1977 (Protection of the Civilian Population). 
 230. See, e.g., Multiple People Shot Near Empire State Building, CBS NEWS (Aug. 
24, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57499732/multiple-people-shot-
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gang-related shooting231 could not be deemed terrorism for this 
reason.  “Violence” would be limited to the use of firearms, 
explosives, or other devices that have the capacity to maim or kill 
many people.232  Accordingly, violence by way of fistfights or small 
capacity instruments of violence, such as a knife, would not qualify as 
terrorism because the potential to harm many people quickly is not 
present.  The rubric also would leave “duds” outside of the terrorism 
designation, such as a homemade device intended to maim or kill 
many people that lacks that actual capacity.  It also would eliminate 
cyber-attacks from the ambit of terrorism.  “A location with a high 
concentration of individuals” refers to physical spaces where there is 
a large and fluid population, such as cities or certain places of public 
accommodation.233  Temporary population density—a sporting event 
at a football stadium, for example—may be a suitable metric to 
determine when a physical location has such characteristics.  “A 
public location with constitutional significance” means a physical 
setting open to the general public that is essential to the exercise of 
rights expressly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, such as 
places of worship and places where individuals associate to engage in 
speech (e.g., a speakers’ corner in a public park, or a civic hall).234  
This would eliminate from contention any public space that cannot 
find a link to the express text of the Constitution, or any space closed 
to others.  “A location that is essential to the operation of the 
government” refers to a space critical to the success of our democratic 
society, such as schools, government buildings, and polling booths.235  
Even if these three spaces were given a narrow construction, they 
would still serve to hone terrorism on locations that have many 
                                                                                                                 
near-empire-state-building (“A man laid off about a year ago went to his former 
workplace . . . and shot a co-worker in the face, killing him . . . .”). 
 231. See, e.g., Dean Reynolds, Even Tiniest Chicagoans Caught in Gang Crossfire, 
CBS NEWS (July 2, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57465408/even-
tiniest-chicagoans-caught-in-gang-crossfire/ (reporting on the death of seven-year-old 
Heaven Sutton, where “Heaven was standing near the intended target . . . when the 
gunman walked up and fired ten times,” striking and killing Heaven). 
 232. Such definitions can be taken from existing federal statutes. See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 2332f (2012) (prohibiting the use of “an explosive or other lethal device” in 
certain places); id. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a) (2012) (prohibiting the use of “fire, a firearm, a 
dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device” for certain purposes). 
 233. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5302(5) (2006) (including “closely settled” as a defining 
characteristic of a city). 
 234. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. 
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potential victims and whose impact would be quite problematic for 
our society and public institutions.236 
Fourth, there is the “media” counterargument.  If a location with 
constitutional significance may have a greater claim to terrorism, the 
media should be able to invoke this principle because of the freedom 
of the press that is expressly guaranteed and found in the First 
Amendment.237  While the “freedom of press” clause in the First 
Amendment provides a constitutional hook for the media to be 
included in this paradigm, and while the media serve an important 
role in society, the proposed definition would require that the 
protected area of constitutional significance be open to the public.  
Accordingly, to the extent that the media are places of business, an 
incident of mass violence in such a place would not be within the 
bounds of the terrorism definition advanced here. 
Fifth, the “mental health” counterargument stresses that the 
perpetrators of mass violence that have mental disabilities may not be 
sufficiently morally or legally culpable to warrant the “terrorist” 
label.  There is a sense that some of the perpetrators of the incidents 
described herein may suffer, or may have suffered, from mental 
illness.  This mental health concern has been raised particularly with 
respect to James Holmes238 and Adam Lanza.239  This concern raises 
                                                                                                                 
 236. A commentator on a draft of this Article suggests that, under the proposed 
formulation, if gang member #1 shoots and kills an “innocent” on the side street near 
his house as part of an initiation ritual (therefore, premeditated), then he is charged 
with murder, yet if gang member #2 does the same act on the Washington Mall at 
night he would be a terrorist, calling such different outcomes highly problematic and 
arbitrary.  I respectfully respond that this is not necessarily the outcome under my 
proposed formulation.  The same underlying act may be more harmful in the second 
case if it is takes place in a dense area, has more potential victims, and can chill far 
more people.  Moreover, the gravamen of the analysis would be such facts, including 
the population, rather than dictated by whether the shooting took place on a “street” 
as opposed to a “city.”  As this Article suggests, the general characteristics of a city 
help explain why such spatial considerations are relevant in a fact-specific assessment 
as to whether an act of terrorism has occurred. 
 237. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 238. See Jack Healy, Suspect in Colorado Killings Enters Insanity Plea, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/suspect-in-colorado-
movie-killings-enters-insanity-plea.html?_r=0 (noting that Holmes has pleaded not 
guilty by reason of insanity). 
 239. See Gabriella Rosen Kellerman, Diagnosing Adam Lanza, ATLANTIC (Dec. 
16, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/12/diagnosing-adam-
lanza/266322/# (“In the aftermath of the Sandy Hook massacre, reports have surfaced 
that shooter Adam Lanza suffered from some sort of mental disability or disorder, 
the exact nature of which is thus far a matter of dispute.”). 
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the question as to the relationship between my proposed formulation 
and the prospect that the perpetrator may be mentally ill. 
In response to my Essay suggesting that Mr. Holmes should be 
deemed a terrorist, Cord Jefferson, writing in The Nation, suggested 
that Mr. Holmes might be mentally disturbed.240  As my proposed 
definition of terrorism requires premeditation as a necessary element, 
and as diminished mental capacity may preclude a finding of 
premeditation,241 my definition would encompass or accommodate the 
mental illness possibility noted by Mr. Jefferson. 
Sixth, the “morality” counterargument suggests that this Article’s 
attempt to root terrorism laws in a more descriptive or objective area, 
and thereby sever current laws’ reliance on subjective intent, is itself 
fraught with subjectivity.242  Indeed, some may seize on the stated 
purposes of terrorism that has been described here—for society to 
marginalize individuals for particularly reprehensible actions, and for 
the law to memorialize that judgment and impose especially harsh 
punishments on those who commit these sorts of deplorable attacks—
and expose the value-judgments underlying the purposes.243  What 
counts as sufficiently reprehensible to warrant the public 
determination to socially banish and brand an individual is inherently 
subjective, some may say.  The line between what is and what is not 
damning is drawn by collective judgments that themselves may be 
informed by the people’s religious, political, or social views, 
experiences, biases, and backgrounds, skeptics may continue. 
I concede this point.  The law is a human institution; personal or 
external considerations on legal decisions cannot be completely 
eliminated, and thus find their way into our thinking on subjects, our 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Cord Jefferson, Why Can’t Terrorists Be Mentally Ill Too?, NATION (July 25, 
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 241. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 242. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text; see also Frederick V. Perry, 
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decisionmaking processes, and into our final determinations.244  One 
may still endeavor, nonetheless, to minimize undue influence on 
important matters, and to focus decisionmakers on aspects or issues 
that may guide proper analyses and ultimate conclusions.245  This is 
not to ignore value-judgments, but to channel their attention to 
factors that objectively matter, and to make a case for why those 
factors matter more than an exclusive fixation on intent. 
Defining terrorism in the wake of attacks on innocents and on our 
feelings of safety generates insecurities and sensitivities that may 
cloud otherwise dispassionate and principled decisionmaking.  
Accordingly, the ability to filter through emotional and personal 
considerations in this particular context is even more complicated.  
Defining terrorism is an especially difficult human endeavor when 
humanity itself is challenged.  But, in the end, the enduring hope is 
that considerations of space and what has occurred can bring us closer 
to some semblance of clarity and shared consistency on the meaning 
of terrorism.  I am unconvinced that these potential criticisms, either 
alone or in any combination, are sufficient to take this proposed 
definition off the table. 
CONCLUSION 
An inquiry into ways to improve the definition of terrorism in 
federal law is necessary, given the inconsistency in messages from our 
primary federal leaders and the disappointing application of federal 
terrorism law to recent domestic incidents of mass violence; the need 
for this inquiry is further supported by the mismatch between what 
federal law says about whether an incident constitutes terrorism, on 
one hand, and political and social views as to what constitutes 
terrorism, on the other.  Current federal terrorism law is both unclear 
and unsatisfactory. 
                                                                                                                 
 244. See also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover 
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This Article suggests that considerations of space are relevant in 
ascertaining the difficult and complicated question of whether an 
incident qualifies as terrorism.  It is an examination of cities in 
particular, I believe, that best showcases the relevance of space in 
determining whether terrorism has occurred.  Indeed, cities contain a 
high concentration of individuals and those populations are not only 
significant, but fluid.  This means that the impact of an act of domestic 
mass violence is wider and more deserving of the terrorist label than 
incidents in other physical settings.  This is not to suggest that only 
highly packed places should receive special consideration in a 
terrorism analysis; other areas within our society, because they have 
been singled out in the Constitution and because of their significance 
to our democracy, also warrant heightened attention.  Spatial 
considerations are valuable in their own right, and, in a broader sense, 
point towards a definition of terrorism that is descriptive or objective 
in nature, to be contrasted with the current model that is wholly 
instrumental and essentially subjective. 
This Article does not presume to solve the fundamental social and 
legal problem in this nation of what terrorism means, but instead sets 
a modest aim: to contribute to and enrich the conversation on the 
meaning of terrorism.  This Article, it is hoped, will facilitate the 
development of a more coherent and well-received definition when 
and if the contents of this powerful term are revisited by Congress. 
